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1.

INTRODUCTION

In the months approaching China's resumption of sovereignty
over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, U.S. policy analysts are

painstakingly reviewing how the territory will change under
Chinese rule. The answer is important to U.S. interests for
several reasons:

first, because of the enormous U.S. economic

presence in Hong Kong; second, because any adverse develop-

ments in Hong Kong are likely to affect U.S.-China relations; and
third, because China's promise to give Hong Kong a high degree
of autonomy under the "one country, two systems" policy has

political implications for Taiwan.
A confident assessment of Hong Kong's future remains elusive.

On one hand, Hong Kong's economy, increasingly tied to the
expanding economy of mainland China, continues to grow.

Annual growth in the past few years has been five to six percent.
Over the last decade, Hong Kong has climbed from the fifteenth

to the eighth largest trader in the world, and its per capita gross
domestic product ("GDP") has risen from $6,000 to $23,800.

With a population of only six million, Hong Kong's economy

now equals one-fifth the GDP of mainland China and its 1.2
billion people. Along with its extraordinary economic track
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record, Hong Kong plays an increasingly vital role as a conduit
and financial center for U.S., Chinese, and international economic
and business interests. Under these circumstances, some in the
United States believe that the change from British to Chinese
sovereignty will make little difference and that Hong Kong will
continue to demonstrate strong economic growth, to foster a
friendly and supportive business environment, and to provide an
overall atmosphere that allows significant scope for individual
freedom.
Despite positive signs, Hong Kong's political future and the
individual rights of its citizens remain tenuous. In the past,
Britain and China have argued acrimoniously over political
reforms, new governmental institutions, and other arrangements
surrounding the colony's transition to Chinese rule. China
repeatedly has accused Britain of using its last years as Hong
Kong's sovereign to establish new democratic institutions where
none existed before and has said that these will hamper China's
own ability to rule Hong Kong. As a result, China has threatened
to undo many of the political reforms enacted during the past few
years under Hong Kong's last British Governor, Christopher
Patten. Additionally, during the course of Sino-British transition
negotiations, political concerns occasionally caused Chinese leaders
to hold up business contracts, stall in approving major construction projects, and hamper other economic arrangements in Hong
Kong. Such behavior has convinced some that China is likely to
continue politicizing economic and other decisions in Hong Kong
after 1997. These critics believe that Chinese leaders are willing
to tolerate economic losses in Hong Kong when issues of
sovereignty and Chinese governance are involved.
Throughout much of the decade since the ratification of the
Sino-British Joint Declaration ("Joint Declaration") in 1985,1 the
United States has assumed a low profile on matters involving
' See Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984,
U.K.-P.R.C., 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 9543), para. 1[hereinafter Joint
Declaration]. The Joint Declaration was the final result of several years of
negotiations between China and Britain over Hong Kong's future. The
agreement lays out China's basic policies and guarantees regarding Hong Kong,

including policies on rights of Hong Kong citizens and foreign nationals, Hong
Kong's legislative, judicial, and other governmental institutions, and financia
and monetary arrangements. See id. para. 3. The agreement was initialed on
September 26, 1984; signed on December 19, 1984; and ratified on May 27,
1985. See id.
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Hong Kong. The U.S. policy is due, in part, to the fact that no
country questions China's sovereign rights over Hong Kong
beginning July 1, 1997. The low U.S. profile with respect to
Hong Kong may also be accounted for by the closeness of U.S.British relations and the reluctance of U.S. policymakers to
second-guess British governance decisions.2 As the July 1, 1997
transition date approaches and the British presence in the colony
wanes, interested parties in both Hong Kong and China have
increased pressure on U.S. policymakers to adopt favored policies.
In this growing lobbying effort, the options that some in Hong
Kong support directly conflict with options supported by Beijing.
Moreover, there is divided opinion within Hong Kong itself.
Chinese leaders have objected to what one official called the
"gradual insistence" by some U.S. policymakers on "inserting the
United States" into the affairs of Hong Kong,3 and signs indicate
that they will continue to object. Liberal-minded activists in
Hong Kong, however, wish for a broader and more visible U.S.
presence, particularly in the form of support for democratic
principles and institutions. The U.S. and international business
communities in Hong Kong, while receptive to a more visible
U.S. presence, nevertheless argue for involvement that respects
Beijing's concerns and targets specific matters, often economic
issues. All groups interested in U.S. involvement in Hong Kong
are likely to become more vocal in making their cases to U.S. officials as the transition date approaches. The U.S. Congress has
been receptive in the past to those groups that argue for more
assertive U.S. involvement in Hong Kong's political life. Given
U.S. interests in the territory, Congress is likely to remain active
in 1997 and beyond.
2. U.S. INTERESTS IN HONG KONG
Hong Kong has long been a focal point of U.S. economic,
political, and other interests in Asia. Each set of interests brings
forth its own advocates, both domestic and international. These
interests contribute to the U.S. policymaking process, particularly
in the U.S. Congress. During the months preceding and follow2 Henry Kissinger once referred to the close U.S.-British relations as the
"special relationship." HENRY KISSINGER, WHiTE HOUSE YEARS 86 (1979).

' Interview with a Chinese official who cannot be named in this Article,
in Beijing, China (1985).
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ing Hong Kong's transition of sovereignty to Chinese rule, all
parties are likely to increase pressure on U.S. policymakers to
adopt favored policies. Complicating the U.S. policymaking
process, U.S. interests in Hong Kong often compete with, rather
than complement, one another.
2.1.

U.S. Economic Interests in Hong Kong

Hong Kong is the largest base of U.S. economic operations in
Asia. Today, about 31,000 Americans live and work in Hong
Kong, and approximately 1,000 U.S. firms have corporate offices
there.' By 1995, U.S. investments in Hong Kong totaled $10.5
billion. According to the U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong,
U.S. exports to the territory in 1994 amounted to $11 billion,
while U.S. imports were about $9 billion.' Hong Kong is the
major transshipment point for Chinese products exported to the
United States, which were valued at more than $30 billion in
1993. Because of the sizable U.S. economic interests in Hong
Kong, the U.S. business community tends to press the U.S.
government for a more calibrated and targeted approach toward
matters involving Hong Kong and to downplay politically
sensitive issues.
2.2.

The U.S. Perspective on Human Rights and Democracy in
Hong Kong

Since the 1989 military crackdown in Tiananmen Square, and
mindful of massive demonstrations in Hong Kong that followed
Tiananmen, U.S. officials have paid close attention to the
prospects for human rights and political freedom in Hong Kong.
Americans have been generally supportive of Governor Patten's
modest measures to increase the level of democracy in Hong Kong
prior to its reversion to China. Many U.S. officials have been
critical of China's pressure tactics and opposition to Patten's
political initiatives. U.S. officials and Members of Congress have
been particularly outspoken against Chinese statements that
4 Most of the corporate offices in Hong Kong function as financial and
marketing bases for manufacturing facilities in mainland China and as
headquarters for business activities throughout Asia.
I See Consul General Richard W. Mueller, America's Long-Term Interest
in Hong Kong, Address to the Foreign Correspondents' Club, Hong Kong
(May 22, 1995), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dstate File.
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Beijing will dissolve Hong Kong's Legislative Council in 1997.
2.3.

Hong Kong as a Modelfor Chinese Reunification with
Taiwan

U.S. leaders sometimes view Beijing's handling of the Hong
Kong transition as a method of forecasting the way Beijing could
be expected to handle reunification with Taiwan. Chinese
authorities have reinforced this view by frequent statements that
the "one country, two systems" policy approach is what China
will follow for both territories. A smooth transition in Hong
Kong would buttress the arguments of those who assert that U.S.
interests in Taiwan would not suffer from reunification. A rocky
transition would support the arguments of those who press for
strong U.S. support for Taiwan's status as separate from the
mainland.
2.4. Most Favored Nation Treatment of Chinese Exports
Hong Kong has been an important element in the U.S. debate
over China policy since the Tiananmen crackdown, especially in
the annual debate over whether the United States should approve
Most Favored Nation ("MFN") tariff treatment for Chinese
exports to the United States.6 Critics of China have argued in
the past that MFN status should be withheld from China unless
Beijing meets certain conditions, including a more accommodating
Chinese stance on democracy and human rights in Hong Kong.
An important counter-argument has held that cutting off MFN
treatment would have a disastrous economic and perhaps negative
political impact on Hong Kong, especially because the bulk of
Chinese exports to the United States passes through the colony.
2.5. Export Controls
Non-proliferation of weapons is a top policy priority for the
6 MFN is the tariff treatment that the United States extends to almost all
of its tradingpartners. China's eligibility for MFN status is subject to an

annual renewal, which the President must request by June 3 each year and
which automatically goes into effect if Congress does not enact a joint
resolution of disapproval within 60 days. See 19 U.S.C § 2431-32 (1994).
Renewal of China s MFN status became controversial the year following the
Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989, and has been the subject of sometimes
rigorous debate in subsequent years. The collateral effect on Hong Kong of
withdrawing China's MFN status has been one of the issues debated.
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United States, which considers China to be a significant proliferation risk. Under British rule, Hong Kong has adhered to nonproliferation principles. The colony has maintained export
controls on high technology and strategic goods effective enough
to qualify for U.S. export control exemptions under section 5(k)
of the U.S. Export Administration Act.7 Although the United
States will continue to treat Hong Kong separately from China
for export control purposes after the 1997 transition, many U.S.
and Hong Kong officials are concerned that Chinese companies
may take advantage of Hong Kong's more liberal export controls
either to ship prohibited arms and materials clandestinely to rogue
states or to import prohibited weapons for use by China's own
military.
3.

BACKGROUND TO DEVELOPMENTS IN HONG KONG

Much of the current U.S. interest and increasing involvement
in Hong Kong results from two issues: developments surrounding
Sino-British negotiations and disagreements over Hong Kong's
future, and lingering U.S. revulsion after China's brutal 1989
display in Tiananmen Square. Before examining the current U.S.
policy toward Hong Kong and its prospects for the future, a brief
review of the relevant aspects of the history of Hong Kong is
useful.
Hong Kong's current situation stems from the terms under
which the British originally acquired the territory, a combination
of wartime concessions and a 99-year lease, the latter negotiated
and signed with China in 1898. In 1982, as the end of the lease
approached, the British government began a series of difficult
bilateral negotiations with China about Hong Kong's future.
These negotiations led to the Joint Declaration, which provided
for the return of all of Hong Kong to China on July 1, 1997.8
Lacking power and basis for opposition, and faced with the
strong Chinese insistence on regaining sovereignty over Hong
Kong, Britain felt compelled to give ground repeatedly during the
course of negotiations leading up to the Joint Declaration. China
made compromises as well, most notably its pledge to leave Hong
Kong's socioeconomic system virtually unchanged for fifty years
' See 50 U.S.C. app. S 2404(k) (1994).
S See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 1.
The U.S. government
maintained a low profile throughout these negotiations.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss1/14
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after 1997 and its promise to approach rule of Hong Kong under
the general guidelines of "one country, two systems." 9 In its final
form, the Joint Declaration set out the basic criteria for Hong
Kong's future, as agreed upon by the British and Chinese
governments."0 Subsequently, British officials reportedly considered initiating political reforms that would grant the people of
Hong Kong greater autonomy in the period leading to 1997. The
British government moved cautiously, however, in part because of
the Chinese government's staunch objections to granting the
Hong Kong government a political status separate from the
People's Republic of China ("P.R.C.") after 1997.
Between 1984 and 1989, the British and Chinese settled into a
pattern of frank but generally cooperative interaction and
negotiation over Hong Kong." Britain, responsible for administering Hong Kong through June 1997, pushed for as much autonomy as possible for the territory. Among other proposals, the
British negotiators suggested the institution of direct elections for
Hong Kong's legislature, the Legislative Council ("Legco"). China
opposed these efforts as attempts to interfere with its own ability
to administer Hong Kong after 1997. These tensions prolonged
the negotiations over plans for the Basic Law.
The Basic Law was finally adopted on April 4, 1990, but many
of its provisions were vague, leaving room for controversy.12
For example, the Basic Law prescribed few details for the election
of Legco. The Basic Law provided only that the Hong Kong
Legislative Council "shall be constituted by election" implemented
"with gradual and orderly progress" and with "the ultimate aim
the election of all 3the members of the Legislative Council by
universal suffrage."
In a second prescription for controversy, the conclusion of the
9 See id.
10 See id.Further details of Hong Kong's future governance were provided
in a second document enacted by the Chinese government, The Basic Law of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China, that willserve as Hong Kong's de facto constitution after 1997. See The
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China (April 4, 1990), translated in 29 I.L.M. 1520 [hereinafter
Basic Law].
" The United States remained uninvolved during the course of the
negotiations between the British and the Chinese.
12 See Basic Law, supra note 10.
13 Id. art. 68.
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Basic Law negotiations coincided with China's June 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square. In the weeks after Tiananmen, over
one million Hong Kong citizens demonstrated against the Chinese
government's action. People in Hong Kong also were influential
in supporting dissidents in China. They smuggled out political
critics as well as information that proved damaging to the Beijing
regime, both at home and abroad. Tiananmen and its aftermath
stimulated the first genuine U.S. attempts to become more
involved in Hong Kong's political future. Tiananmen also
changed British and Chinese attitudes toward Hong Kong in
several ways.
For the British - and, by extension, the Americans - the
Chinese people in Hong Kong, long considered politically
apathetic, suddenly were showing keen interest in politics. Many
in Hong Kong pressed for more support from London to establish
better safeguards against possibly capricious Chinese government
action toward Hong Kong after the 1997 transition. A number
of Hong Kong's increasingly important middle class of professionals and business people advocated strengthening and expanding the
colony's institutions of representative government. Additionally,
these groups began to approach U.S. policymakers for assistance
in helping to assure Hong Kong's future.
For China, Hong Kong's reaction to Tiananmen raised a major
security concern. It heightened China's sensitivity to any action
by the British, the Americans, or any other country that might
encourage political conditions in Hong Kong that were inconsistent with Beijing's concepts of stability. Consequently, when
China's National People's Congress promulgated the Basic Law in
April of 1990, it strengthened wording concerning subversion.
British authorities, while trying to avoid unduly antagonizing
the P.R.C., took several steps to reassure those living in Hong
Kong. The British government passed a Bill of Rights for Hong
Kong citizens in 1991, granted an additional 50,000 Hong Kong
heads of families with close ties to Great Britain the option to
emigrate there, and encouraged the United States, France, and
other countries to grant more generous immigration options to
Hong Kong employees of foreign-owned businesses and institutions.
The British also reaffirmed their support for Hong Kong in
two other ways. First, they proceeded with plans to build a large,
complicated, and expensive airport project. Second, they pushed
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss1/14
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Chinese leaders to agree that Hong Kong legislators elected before
1997 would be allowed to complete their terms after China took
over in July 1997 - a concept known as the "through train."
Almost from the outset, both the airport plan and the "through
train" concept for certain Legco members met with serious
Chinese objections.1 4 Leaders of the P.R.C. effectively froze
international financial support for the airport by asserting that
they had not been adequately consulted on the project and that its
financing might be subject to review after 1997.
In an effort to solve the problems surrounding the airport and
the "through train," and to rejuvenate those programs, in
September 1991 Prime Minister John Major became the first
Western head of government since Tiananmen to travel to Beijing
and meet with Chinese leaders. Although the Prime Minister
signed a memorandum of understanding ("MOU") with Beijing
over the airport, Chinese officials continued to voice reservations
that ultimately made it difficult for the project to proceed.
Under the circumstances, Britain decided to shift the style, if
not the substance, of its policy toward Hong Kong. The more
cautious policy of the recent past - solicitous of P.R.C. concerns
and fearful of antagonizing China - was put aside in favor of a
more direct approach. This approach was implemented under the
leadership of a new Hong Kong Governor, Christopher Patten,
who was also a close friend of Prime Minister Major. Shortly
after assuming office in the Fall of 1992, Governor Patten precipitated a protracted political confrontation with Beijing when he
proposed broadening the political representation of legislative
institutions in Hong Kong. By Western standards, Patten's
proposals seemed mild. The Governor did not propose increasing
the number of directly elected seats in Legco, a figure upon which
China and Britain had already agreed, but instead opted for a
series of steps to institutionalize procedures on which he found
the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law to be silent.15

especially objected to the "through train" concept for certain
Legco members who were vocal critics of the P.R.C., members such as Martin
Lee and Szeto Wah.
" In his reform proposal, Governor Patten expanded the number of
functional constituency seats in Legco from 21 to 30, and broadened their
franchises to include a wider range of workers within each profession. He
14 Beijing

expanded the District Board jurisdiction and abolished the tradition of
appointing some Legco members to serve concurrently on the Executive
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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Beijing was suspicious of the new trends in British policy.
Chinese leaders especially objected to the decision to go ahead
with Hong Kong's New Airport and Port Construction Project.
The huge project came with a price tag in excess of $20 billion,
and involved numerous multinational contracts to construct
terminals, runways, highways, railroad lines, bridges, and a tunnel
crossing Hong Kong Harbor. The project's size and expense
raised Chinese suspicions that Britain would attempt to drain
Hong Kong's substantial treasury surplus prior to 1997. Furthermore, Beijing felt that Britain's handling of the airport proposal
ignored China's insistence that it be sufficiently consulted by
Britain on all major issues affecting Hong Kong after 1997, since
China would ultimately inherit the consequences of those
decisions.
China's greatest objections to British actions were raised
against Patten's political reforms. Beijing swiftly and vigorously
denounced both the Governor and his reform platform, claiming
that the reforms contravened the Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law and were nothing short of an attempt to create new democratic institutions in Hong Kong where none had existed before.
Chinese leaders maintained that Patten's changes would complicate Chinese reassertion of sovereignty in 1997 and, in the
meantime, divide political opinion and reduce business confidence
in the territory. In response to Patten's initiatives, Beijing
announced in February 1994 that it would end the "through train"
to which it had previously agreed, dismantle the current legislative
structure of Hong Kong, and establish a provisional legislative
body not provided for in the Basic Law.'6
4.

CURRENT

U.S. HONG KONG POLICY

China's crackdown in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989,
ended the consensus within the U.S. government that had
characterized much of U.S. policy toward China for the previous
decade. In the months following Tiananmen, the Bush AdminisCouncil, the Governor's advisory board. Additionally, Governor Patten
lowered the voting age from 21 to 18.
6 China first announced that it would establish a separate legislative body
in Hong Kong in November 1992, shortly after Governor Patten announced
his political reform platform. Beijing repeated and confirmed these assertions
periodically in the intervening years, until finally naming a provisional legislature on December 21, 1996.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss1/14
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tration reached a series of decisions to limit sanctions on China
and protect U.S.-China relations. These decisions lacked popular
support and increasingly antagonized Members of Congress. As
a result, Congress began to hold hearings and to debate a wide
range of measures related to every conceivable aspect of U.S.
policy involving China. To some extent, this internal U.S. policy
conflict continues today.
Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 has been
one of the issues addressed in U.S. legislative efforts. Since 1992,
Congress has enacted numerous measures designed to protect U.S.
relations with Hong Kong, to pressure the White House to
monitor closely developments there, and to persuade Chinese
leaders to pursue more enlightened policies. In addition, the
United States has negotiated and continues to negotiate a number
of bilateral agreements with Hong Kong that will apply after the
territory's reversion to Chinese rule. These agreements include:
a civil aviation agreement; an extradition treaty; a mutual legal
assistance agreement; a prison transfer agreement; a bilateral
investment treaty; and agreements on future consular arrangements.
4.1.

The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 199217

Most of the current U.S. policy toward Hong Kong is
encapsulated in a single law, the United States-Hong Kong Policy
Act of 1992."8 Senator Mitch McConnell introduced the bill that
eventually became law because he perceived a lack of coherent
U.S. policy for dealing with the impending Chinese rule over
Hong Kong. The law prescribes how the United States should
conduct bilateral relations with Hong Kong when the territory
becomes a non-sovereign entity. 9
The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act is comprised of four
main sections.2' The first two sections constitute a series of
findings and policy statements that are non-binding expressions of
U.S. policy goals and objectives.2 The Act states that support
for democratization is a fundamental principle of the United
17

22 U.S.C. § 5701-32 (1994).

18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See id.

21See id. S 5701-15.
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States that should apply to U.S. policy toward Hong Kong after
1997,22 and that the United States should play an active role in
maintaining Hong Kong's stability and prosperity.'
The substantive core of the United States-Hong Kong Policy
Act states that the United States will continue to apply U.S. laws
to an autonomous Hong Kong after the transition to Chinese rule
in the same manner that they were applied before the transition. 24 It also extends congressional approval for all treaties and
international agreements between the United States and Hong
Kong so that the treaties and agreements continue in force after
July 1, 1997, and it requires the President to report to Congress
if he determines that Hong Kong is not competent to carry out
its obligations or that it is not "appropriate" for Hong Kong to
have rights or obligations under any such treaty or international
agreement. 2s
The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act also gives the
President authority to issue Executive Orders to suspend U.S. laws
regarding Hong Kong, or portions thereof, if he determines that
Hong Kong is not sufficiently autonomous. 6 In making such a
decision, the President should consider the terms, obligations, and
expectations contained ii the Joint Declaration.'
The Act
provides that the President may terminate any such Executive
Order if he determines that Hong Kong has regained sufficient
autonomy.2
Additionally, the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act
requires that the Secretary of State report to Congress by March
31 in each of six years - 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000
- on eight specific factors regarding Hong Kong.29 These factors
include: (1) significant developments in U.S. relations with Hong
Kong and in agreements that the United States has entered into

id. S 5701(5).
id.
§ 5701(4).
24 See id. § 5721(a).
25 Id. § 5721(b).
26 See id. § 5722(a). Any Executive Order issued under this provision must
be published in the Federal Register. See id. 9 5722(c).
See id. § 5722(b).
28 See id. S 5722(d).
29 See id.
§ 5731.
22 See
21 See
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with Hong Kong;30 (2) developments surrounding the transition
to Chinese sovereignty;31 (3) the nature and extent of official and
unofficial U.S.-Hong Kong exchanges;3 2 (4) any U.S. laws
suspended or reinstituted under sections 201 and 202 of the
Act;33 (5) treaties and international agreements that the President
has determined Hong Kong is incompetent to carry out under
section 201(b) of the Act;34 (6) significant problems in U.S.-Hong
Kong cooperation on export controls;3" (7) "the development of
democratic institutions in Hong Kong;"3 6 and (8) "the nature and
extent of Hong Kong's participation in multilateral forums."37
The Act also requires, where applicable, a separate subreport
on "China: Hong Kong" in U.S. reports that are compiled on a
country-by-country basis.3 This provision expressly affects: (1)
reports compiled under sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961;"9 (2) trade barrier reports required by
section 181 of the Trade Act of 1974;40 and (3) economic policy
and trade practices reports required by section 2202 of the Export
Enhancement Act of 1988.41
4.2.

CongressionalAmendment of the United States-Hong Kong
Policy Act

The 104th Congress battled over foreign policy issues in 1995
and 1996, both internally and with the White House. Debate was
especially rancorous within Congress over attempts to reorganize

10 See id.
§ 5731(1).
31 See id.
§ 5731(2).
32 See id.
§ 5731(3).
3 See id.
§ 5731(4). Sections 201 and 202 of the United States-Hong Kong
Policy Act are codified at 22 U.S.C. SS 5721-22 (1994).
" See itd. § 5731(5). Section 201(b) of the United States-Hong Kong Policy
Act is codified at 22 U.S.C. S 5721(b) (1994).
35 See id.
§ 5731(6).
36 Id. § 5731(7).
37 Id. § 5731(8).
3S

31

See id. 5732.
See id.
5 5732(1). Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance

Act of 1961 are codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151n(d), 2304(b) (1994).
40 See id.§ 5732(2). Section 181 of the Trade Act of 1974 is codified at 19

U.S.C. § 2241 (1994).
41See id.
§ 5732(3). Section 2202 of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988
is codified at 15 U.S.C. S4711 (1994).
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U.S. foreign policy programs and departments, levels of U.S.
foreign assistance funding, and international population assistance
programs. U.S. policy toward China figured prominently in some
of these debates, particularly in the period of time surrounding
China's military exercises and missile test firings in the Taiwan
Straits.42
Some Members of Congress disagreed with the Clinton
Administration's policy of "engagement" with China43 and
believed that a tougher approach would better influence Chinese
behavior. As a result, the 104th Congress sought to strengthen
the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act by adding a requirement
for a 1996 report, expanding the information required to be
included in the report, and making the reporting requirement a
permanent one. Using three different legislative vehicles, the
104th Congress successfully amended the United States-Hong
Kong Policy Act of 1992 in the first two of these ways, but was
not able to make the Hong Kong report a permanent annual
requirement.
4.2.1.

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1996 and 19974

The Conference Report to Senate Bill 908/House Bill 1561,
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, began as the 104th
Congress' major vehicle for considering legislative provisions
relating to China and Hong Kong. 4 Although the bill provoked
heated debates between the Clinton Administration and Congress
over a wide range of foreign policy, restructuring, and reorganization issues, it did not become law. On April 12, 1996, the bill
42

On March 8, 1996, amidst international tensions during Taiwan's first

direct presidential elections, China began conducting ballistic missile exercises
in the Taiwan Straits off two key Taiwanese ports. On March 10, 1996, the

United States responded by sending two carrier battle groups into the Straits.
43

At a news conference in the White House briefing room on May 26,

1994, President Clinton defined the "engagement policy" as engaging China "in
a growing web of political and economic cooperation and contacts." President
William J. Clinton, Remarks at Press Conference on China Trade Status (May
26, 1994), in U.S. Newswire, available in Westlaw, File No. 3823616. The
President further stated his view that "the best path for advancing freedom in
China is for the United States to intensify and- broaden its engagement with
that nation." Id.
" H.R. 1561, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 908, 104th Cong. (1995).
4 See S. 908, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1561, 104th Cong. (1995).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss1/14
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was vetoed by President Clinton for several reasons, none of
which was related to the Hong Kong provisions. 4
In the legislation, Congress attempted to amend section 301 of
the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, which relates to
reporting requirements.' Congress proposed three changes: (1)
requiring that an additional report be submitted by March 31,4
1996, a year which had been skipped in the original public law;
(2) adding a permanent annual reporting requirement to extend
beyond the year 2000; 49 and (3) requiring that the annual March
reports include more detailed information on Hong Kong's
situation. 0 In listing the last amendment to the United StatesHong Kong Policy Act, S. 908 specifically linked the amendment
to past "deficiencies in reports submitted to the Congress" by the
The
Clinton Administration under 22 U.S.C. § 5731."
President's veto of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act ended
this particular attempt to strengthen the Hong Kong provisions
in U.S. law.
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act would have authorized
appropriations for the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce for fiscal
year 1996. The House Committee on International Relations reported on H.R.
1561 on May 19, 1995. See H.R. REP. No. 104-128, pt. 1 (1995Y. The bill was
passed by the House on June 8, 1995, by a vote of 222-192. On December 14,
1995, the Senate passed an amended version of the bill by a vote of 82-16,
necessitating a conference. The final Conference Report was passed by the
House on March 12, 1996, by a vote of 226-172, and by the Senate on March
28, 1996, by a vote of 52-44. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-478 (1996).
President Clinton vetoed the bill on April 12, 1996. A veto override attempt
in the House on April 30, 1996, failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds
margin to pass, and the Foreign Relations Authorization Act died.
47 See S. 908.
4' The language contained in S. 908 would have amended 22 U.S.C. § 5731
"by inserting 'March 31, 1996,' after 'March 31, 1995.'" 141 § 605(a)(2).
49 S. 908 would have amended 22 U.S.C. § 5731 "by striking 'and March
31, 2000,' and inserting 'March 31, 2000, and every year thereafter.'" Id.
605(a)(2).
50 S. 908 added six more requirements to the eight reporting requirements
These additional requirements includea detailed
in 22 U.S.C. § 5731.
information on: (1) the Basic Law and its consistency with the Joint
Declaration; (2) the openness and fairness of elections to Hong Kong's
legislature; (3) the openness and fairness of the election of Hong Kong's new
chief executive, and-the executive's accountability to the legisl-ature; (4) the
treatment of political parties in Hong Kong; (5) the independence of Hong
Kong 's judiciary and its power to exercise final judgment over Hong Kong law;
and (6) Hong Kong's Bill of Rights. See id. § 605).
51 Id.
46
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Foreign Operations,Export Financing and
Related ProgramsAppropriationsAct, 19962

With the Foreign Relations Authorization Act obviously in
deep trouble, Members of Congress interested in amending the
United States-Hong Kong Policy Act turned to the 1996 Foreign
Operations Appropriations measure.5 3 The annual foreign
operations bill is the primary legislative vehicle for reviewing and
funding the U.S. foreign assistance program and for influencing
executive branch foreign policymaking. The Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill was extraordinarily controversial, becoming
at one point stalemated for three months because of international
population assistance and family planning programs.54 Ultimately, however, the bill passed, and the 104th Congress succeeded in
enacting some of the provisions that it had attempted to enact in
the doomed Foreign Relations Authorization Act.
Section 576 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act amended section 301 of the
Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 by requiring that an additional
report be submitted by March 31, 1996"s and requiring that
specific information be included in the 1996 report.5 6 The
information required in the 1996 report included information on:
52 Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-107, 110 Stat. 704 (1996).
51 See H.R. 1868, 104th Cong. (1995). The 1996 Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill was reported by the House Appropriations Committee on
June 15, 1995. It passed the House on July 11, 1995, and passed the Senate,
amended, on September 21, 1995 by a vote of 91-9. A Conference Report was
filed on October 26, 1995. The House agreed to the Conference Report on
October 31, 1995, by a vote of 351-71, but with one amendment in disagreement on international family planning assistance. The Senate agreed to the
Conference Report on November 1, 1995, by a vote of 90-6, with an
amendment to the House amendment. After a three month stalemate, the bill
was enacted by reference when conferees attached compromise language and
H.R. 1868 to the Continuing Resolution on Appropriations, H.R. 3019, which
the President then signed on January 26, 1996. H.R. 1868 was later enacted in
its own right as Pub. L. No. 104-107 on February 12, 1996. See Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-107, 110 Stat. 704 (1996).
s4 See supra note 53.
ss See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-107, § 576(a), 110 Stat. 704, 750
(1996).
56 See id. S 576(b).
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(1) the Basic Law and its consistency with the Joint
Declaration;
(2) the openness and fairness of elections to [Hong Kong's]
legislature;
(3) the openness and fairness of the election of [Hong
Kong's] chief executive and the executive's accountability
to the legislature;
(4) the treatment of political parties [in Hong Kong];
(5) the independence of [Hong Kong's] judiciary and its
ability to exercise the power of final judgment over Hong
Kong law; and
(6) [Hong Kong's] Bill of Rights.'
Although the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill was not
passed until February 12, 1996, Clinton Administration officials
had anticipated the new requirements imposed by the law. The
Administration submitted the additional Hong Kong report by
the March 31, 1996 deadline, complete with the additional
information required by the new law.
4.2.3.

Omnibus AppropriationsAct for Fiscal Year

1997r,
The 104th Congress turned to the Hong Kong issue for a third
time in the Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997."9
Once again, Congress included a provision directing that additional information be included in the annual Hong Kong report."
Like the Foreign Operations Appropriations measure, the added
requirements were imposed for one report only, in this case the
17 Id. Although Congress could have used this bill to amend the United
States-Hong Kong Policy Act to permanently require the additional information in future reports, appropriators generally like to accommodate any
necessary changes in the appropriation -bill for that year without amending
permanent law. Thus, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill dealt only

with the requirements of the March 1996 Hong Kong report and not with the

requirements of future reports.
" Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L.No. 104-208,
S 571 (1996).
59 See id.
60

See id.
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report due by March 31, 1997.61 The additional requirements
imposed by the Omnibus Appropriations Act were almost
identical to those required under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and those in the vetoed Foreign Relations Authorization Act.6 2
4.2.4.

Other CongressionalActions

The 104th Congress considered legislation to extend diplomatic
privileges, exemptions, and immunities to Hong Kong's Economic
and Trade Offices in the United States. Currently, representatives
of Hong Kong stationed in the United States receive their
diplomatic privileges because of their affiliation with the British
government. In recognition of the impending transition to
Chinese rule and mindful of U.S. promises to treat Hong Kong as
an autonomous entity separate from the P.R.C., Senate Bill 2130
sought to give Hong Kong diplomatic privileges under the
provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act, 63
which applies to public international organizations." The Senate
considered the bill on September 28, 1996, and passed it by

See id. The 1997 report was required by section 301 of the original
United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. See 22 U.S.C. S 5731 (1994).
62 Compare Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997, S 571 with
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-107, S 576, 110 Stat. 704, 750 (1996) and H.R. 1561,
104th Cong. (1995) and S. 908, 104th Cong. (1995). In the Omnibus
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Congress reflected China's decisions
on HI-ong Kong's legislature, changing the reporting requirement from one on
the "fairness of elections for the legislature" to the new requirement of a report
on China's plans to dissolve Hong Kong's elected legislature and replace it with
a provisionl appointed body. See Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
1997, § 571. The other five additional requirements are the same as those listed
for the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, and include reports on: the
Basic Law and its consistency with the Joint Declaration; the openness and
fairness of the election of Hong Kong's chief executive and the executive's
accountability to the legislature; the treatment of political parties in Hong
Kong; the independence of the judiciary and its ability to exercise the power
of final judgment over Hong Kong law; and Hong Kong's Bill of Rights. See
id.; Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, § 576.
63 See S. 2130, 104th Cong. (1996). Senate Bill 2130 was an original measure
reported to the Senate by Senator Helms on September 25, 1996, without
written report. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,291 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996).
64 See 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1994).
61
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unanimous consent without amendment."5 Because the House
did not act on the measure before adjournment, the issue has not
been resolved.
In the past, concern for the future of Hong Kong residents has
led Members of Congress to address issues outside the framework
of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act. Congress has acted
several times, for example, on issues relating to visas for Hong
Kong residents. The 101st Congress enacted the Immigration Act
of 1990,66 which establishes a separate immigrant visa quota for
Hong Kong and offers a deferred visa to Hong Kong residents,
thereby providing a possible future refuge without provoking an
immediate exodus.6 7 In the 103rd Congress, Senator Connie
Mack and Representative John Porter were especially concerned
about possible Chinese reprisals against Hong Kong journalists
because of their reporting. 6 Each of the two Congressmen
introduced legislation that would have provided a certain number
of deferred visas to Hong Kong journalists and their families. 69
CURRENT AND PENDING BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENTS

5.

Section 201(b) of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act sets
the broad policy parameters under which the U.S. President can
continue, suspend, or judge to be inappropriate existing U.S.

agreements with Hong Kong.7' Hong Kong's impending change
in sovereignty raises a number of unprecedented and complicated
questions for the United States involving the continued validity of
U.S. bilateral and multilateral agreements with Hong Kong that
were negotiated, signed, and implemented while Great Britain was
the sovereign. Because of the United States-Hong Kong Policy

See 142 CONG. REC. S11,658-59 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996).
See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
67 U.S. visas generally must be used within the fiscal year that they are
issued. The Immigration Act of 1990 permitted extension of the period of
validity until January 1, 2002, for immigrant visas issued to certain aliens before
September 1, 2001. See Immigration Act of 1990, S 154(a)(1)-(2). Hong Kong
residents are the only aliens to whom this extension applies. See id. § 154(b).
68 See 139 CONG. REC. S3867-68 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Mack); 139 CONG. REc. E587-88 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Porter).
69 See S. 665, 103rd Cong. (1993); H.R. 1265, 103rd Cong. (1993).
70 See 22 U.S.C. § 5721 (1994).
65

66
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Act, continuation of these agreements after the transition date
depends partly on the President's future decisions. The continuing viability of U.S. agreements with Hong Kong is also contingent upon Hong Kong's future capacity either to continue or to
enter into international agreements in its own right, without
interference from Beijing. 71 In some cases, application of agreements to Hong Kong may also depend on the acquiescence of
China, as the new sovereign.
The United States currently maintains approximately nineteen
bilateral agreements with Hong Kong, many of which actually are
legal agreements with Great Britain that were "extended" to Hong
Kong. The fact that bilateral U.S.-British agreements have been
extended to Hong Kong in the past raises both policy and
procedural questions. As of this writing, whether and how many
of the approximately forty U.S. bilateral agreements with the
P.R.C. may be extended to Hong Kong in the future remains
unclear.72
Apart from bilateral agreements with both Hong Kong and
China, the United States currently is also a party to approximately forty multilateral agreements with Hong Kong, and to approximately fifty-one multilateral agreements with the P.R.C., raising
similar questions about whether and how to extend these
agreements to the non-signatory party.
Twenty multilateral agreements bind all three parties. Problems should be minimal in continuing to apply these to Hong
Kong after reversion to Chinese sovereignty. Their continued
application, nevertheless, raises practical difficulties for the future.
These difficulties include decisions on who the "central authority"
is for the purposes of a particular agreement, what are the proper

71 Paragraph

3(2) of the Joint Declaration promises Hong Kong a "high

degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs, which are the
responsibilities of" China. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(2).
Paragraph 3(10) of the Joint Declaration, however, provides that Hong Kong
will have the authority on its own to "maintain and develop economic and
cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements with states, regions, and
relevant international organizations." Id. para. 3(10).
72 According to U.S. Treaties in Force, the United States and China have
approximately 40 bilateral treaties and agreements. See U.S.T. 51-52 (1996).
There may be other treaties or agreements in force, however, that deal with
more specialized areas. Although additional treaties may not be accounted for
in U.S. Treaties in Force, any agreement made by a branch of the U.S.
government would have the effect of law.
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channels of communication, and which party should be accountable for agreement breaches.
Given the status of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, an
agreement between two sovereign nations, and the authority that
the agreement gives to the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group
("JLG"), 73 the United States has had little influence over the
course of legal affairs in Hong Kong during the transition process.
Transition arrangements in Hong Kong were seen by the United
States as delicate political matters to be handled by the British.
British officials, in fact, encouraged this view. Additionally, the
JLG alone had been given responsibility for reviewing and making
determinations about each of Hong Kong's agreements with other
countries. In each case, until that process was completed,
countries with agreements with Hong Kong were unsure of what
action might be needed.
By early 1996, Clinton Administration officials determined
that U.S. interests would be better served if the United States
became more involved in the transition process. U.S. policymakers began to hold discussions with Chinese and Hong Kong
government officials about the continued application of U.S.
agreements and treaties with Hong Kong after the transition. As
of the writing of this article, these discussions are ongoing.
Ultimately, the United States and China will have to reach
decisions on the following issues:
(1)Current U.S.-Hong Kong bilateral agreements that will
remain in force in Hong Kong after 1997, but that will not
be extended to the P.R.C.;
(2)Current U.S.-P.R.C. bilateral agreements that will be
extended to Hong Kong after 1997;
(3)Current multilateral agreements in force for Hong
7' The "JLG" was created under Annex I[ of the Joint Declaration. See
Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex II, S 2. Sections 4 and 5 of Annex II

specify matters for consideration by the JLG to include any actions the two
governments need to take "to ensure the continued application of international
rights and obligations affecting Hong Kong," and actions to help the Hong
Kong government "conclude agreements [on economic and cultural matters]

with states, regions, and relevant international organizations." Id. Annex II,§

4(b), 5(b). The JLG is currently in the process of reviewing all bilateral and

multilateral agreements to determine which should lapse, which should remain
in force, and which should be replaced with other agreements.
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Kong, but not for the P.R.C., that the P.R.C. will agree to
continue in force in Hong Kong after 1997;
(4)Current multilateral agreements in force for the P.R.C.
and the United States, but not for Hong Kong, which the
P.R.C. will agree to extend to Hong Kong after 1997; and
(5)Mechanisms for administering the various agreements
after 1997.
As of early 1997, U.S. Administration officials had formed
preliminary positions on a number of issues. For example, they
had decided which bilateral agreements concerning Hong Kong
should not survive the transition. These included the mutual
defense assistance agreement and the consular convention74 U.S.
officials had also reached preliminary agreement about which
bilateral agreements with the P.R.C. should not be extended to
Hong Kong. These included agreements on matters that were
either presumed or known to be within Hong Kong's sphere of
autonomy after 1997, such as agreements on postal matters and
intellectual property rights."5 Other agreements unlikely to be
extended after the transition are those that do not appear relevant

to Hong Kong. 6 In addition, U.S. policymakers concluded that
some agreements warranted further discussion as to their applica4 See Consular Convention, June 6, 1951, U.S.-U.K., 3 L.S.T. 3426; Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement, Jan. 27, 1950, U.S.-U.K., 1 U.S.T. 126. The
consular convention and the mutual defense assistance agreement cover foreign
affairs and defense, respectively. Those matters in Hong Kong will be under
the authority of the P.R.C. Thus, the existing agreements, negotiated with
Great Britain, will not apply after the transition.
I Although postal matters are not specifically mentioned in the Joint
Declaration, U.S. officials have judged them to be within Hong Kong's control
after 1997. Therefore, the parcel post agreement with the P.R.C. would not
apply to Hong Kong. See Parcel Post Agreement Between the Postal Service of
the United States of America and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of the People's Republic of China, Oct. 9, 1980, U.S.-P.R.C., 32 U.S.T.
2920. The U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding on the protection of
intellectual property, which entered into force on January 17, 1992, will not
apply to Hong Kong after the transition because the Basic Law gives control
over intellectual property rights specifically to the Hong Kong government
after the transition. See Basic Law, supra note 10, art. 105; U.S.-China
Memorandum of Understanding on Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17,
1992, U.S.-P.R.C., T.I.A.S. No. 12036.
76 For example, agreements the United States now has with the People's
Republic of China concerning embassy sites and satellite launches do not appear
to affect Hong Kong.
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bility to Hong Kong.27
A number of new U.S. agreements are being discussed either with Hong Kong, when the matter concerns areas where
Hong Kong has been promised autonomy, or with the P.R.C.
These discussions are in various stages of progress, but expectations are that they will be completed before the July 1 transition
date.78 According to U.S. State Department officials, the U.S.
position in these discussions is not to create new situations for the
United States in Hong Kong that did not exist before. Instead,
the talks are to determine how best to continue the status quo
arrangements that have existed in U.S.-Hong Kong relations and
that Beijing in the Joint Declaration promised can continue after
the reversion of sovereignty.79 Three areas of discussion have
particular implications for future U.S. policy: extradition,
consular, and defense.
5.1.

ExtraditionAgreement

The recently negotiated U.S.-Hong Kong extradition agreement is among the most important pending U.S. agreements with
Hong Kong. In an example of what the future may hold,
controversy has already arisen over the new agreement.
On January 7, 1997, a Massachusetts Federal District Court
refused to approve the Hong Kong government's extradition
request for Lui Kin-Hong on one charge of bribery conspiracy

7 Agreements of this type include agreements on atomic energy, fisheries,
and property. See Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the
United States, July23, 1985, U.S.-P.R.C., T.I.A.S. No. 12002; Protocol Between
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the United States of America and the
State Scientific and Technological Commission of the People's Republic of
China on Cooperation in Nuclear Safety Matters, Oct. 7, 1981, U.S.-P.R.C., 33
UST 4111; Convention Relating to the Tenure and Disposition of Real and
Personal Property, Mar. 2, 1899, U.S.-U.K., T.S. No. 146.
7' These agreements include: a new extradition treaty, which has been
approved by the JLG; a bilateral investment agreement; a new consular
convention; a mutual legal assistance agreement; an air services agreement; and
ayrisoner exchange agreement, which is currently awaiting JLG approval. In
addition, the U.S. Department of Defense is currently involved in discussions
about continued U.S.-Hong Kong cooperation, including discussions on an
agreement to allow U.S. Navy ships to continue to make Hong Kong a port-ofcall after the transition date.
71 Interview with a U.S. State Department Official (Jan. 1997).
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and nine substantive bribery charges.80 In denying the extradition request, Chief Judge Joseph L. Tauro reasoned that it was
impossible for the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, as the requesting sovereign, to prosecute and punish Lui prior to Hong Kong's
reversion to the sovereignty of the P.R.C., which currently has no
extradition agreement with the United States." The court's
order held that the terms of the existing U.S.-Hong Kong
Extradition Treaty establish "that Lui cannot be extradited to a
sovereign that is not able to try and to punish him, any
more
2
than he could be extradited to a non-signatory nation."
The District Court's memorandum also made two other
statements about pending arrangements that could complicate
future U.S. policy. First, the court referred to China's harsh,
non-democratic judicial system as the judicial system that would
likely exist in the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region
("S.A.R.") after July 1, 1997.Y3 The court's view on this matter
runs directly counter to China's promises of autonomy enshrined
in the Basic Law, an international agreement signed by both
China and the United Kingdom.84 The view also contradicts the
stated policy of the United States to treat Hong Kong after July
85
1, 1997, as an entity separate and distinct from the P.R.C.
Second, the Court's memorandum inferred that the U.S. Congress, in enacting the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act, did
not intend that the existing extradition treaty would extend
beyond Hong Kong's reversion "absent any further action on
[Congress'] part." 6 Congress, however, in section 201(b) of title
II of the Act, specifically approved the continuation of all treaties
and international agreements already in force with Hong Kong
after the 1997 transition date. 7 Congress' intent was to bolster
"0 See Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, No. CIV. A. No. 96-104849-JLT,
1997 WL 37477, at *12 (D. Mass. Jan. 7, 1997) (memorandum and order
denying extradition request).
11 See id. at '13.
82 Id. at *5.
11 See id. at *12.
84 Article 82 of the Basic Law gives power of final adjudication to Hong
Kong's Court of Final Appeal, to be presided over by Hong Kong judges. See
Basic Law, supra note 10, art. 82.
85 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 5711-15 (1994).
86 See Lui Kin-Hong, 1997 WL 37477, at *9.
87 See 22 U.S.C. § 5721(b) (1994).
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public and international confidence by expressing what U.S.
policy towards Hong Kong would be after the transition.
Moreover, section 201(b) of the United States-Hong Kong
Policy Act gives specific congressional approval for treaties and
agreements that are in force between, the United States and Hong
Kong directly or, as in the case of the extradition treaty under
which Lui Kin-Hong v. United States was brought, for those
treaties and agreements that are actually between the United States
and Great Britain, but that have been extended to Hong Kong."8
Section 202 of the Act reserves to the President alone the power
to determine, by Executive Order, which of these continuing
treaties or agreements should be abrogated. 9
5.2. ConsularDiscussions
Because the operative U.S. consular agreement in Hong Kong
was negotiated and signed with the United Kingdom, U.S.
Administration officials for months held discussions with Chinese
officials on a matter that is within the P.R.C.'s sole jurisdiction U.S. consular arrangements in Hong Kong. A new consular
agreement was finally concluded and signed during the week of
March 24, 1997. According to State Department officials, the U.S.
goal was to reach an agreement that will permit the status quo in
Hong Kong to continue. For instance, U.S. Administration
officials wanted an agreement that allows the United States to
continue to share information with Hong Kong authorities on law
enforcement, intellectual property rights, and export control
issues. All these are currently important functions of the U.S.
consulate in Hong Kong, and they reportedly have been accommodated in the new consular agreement.
Sino-U.S. consular discussions were particularly sensitive in the
areas of law enforcement and security. The U.S. position in these
discussions was to emphasize China's Joint Declaration promises
that the status quo can continue. China's position was to offer all
consulates in Hong Kong the status and treatment conveyed by
the Vienna Convention. Current U.S. consular arrangements in
Hong Kong are both more specific and more beneficial than the
Vienna Convention, as are the consular arrangements the United

s8 See id.
" See id. § 5722.
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States now has with China itself.
Some observers have suggested that the United States should
simply have sought to extend to Hong Kong the current U.S.
consular agreement with China. U.S. officials opposed this
position, preferring to emphasize Hong Kong's separate status
with a separate consular agreement. U.S. officials have faced some
delicate political problems in their request for "special" treatment
in Hong Kong, despite the assertion of State Department officials
that the U.S. goal in these consular discussions was not to create
new situations for the United States in Hong Kong that did not
exist before, but instead to determine how best to continue the
arrangements that have already existed.
For example, U.S. officials wanted to continue to work
directly with Hong Kong government authorities to share
sensitive information on export control violations, alien smuggling, drug trafficking, money laundering, and other enforcement
issues. One concern is that Chinese officials may try to insert
themselves into day-to-day law enforcement interactions between
the United States and Hong Kong after July 1997. Another
example involves questions about whether U.S. law enforcement
efforts in Hong Kong can remain insulated from future bilateral
tensions. This is particularly relevant since in the past China has
sought to impose economic and other costs on U.S. business and
government activities because of political problems in Sino-U.S.
relations. Although some of these questions will not be answered
until the new agreement has been in force, U.S. officials nevertheless appear quite pleased with the consular agreement as signed.
5.3. Defense Issues
On defense and security issues, another area outside of Hong
Kong's promised autonomy, the U.S. Department of Defense
continues to hold discussions with the P.R.C. to determine the
extent to which current U.S.-Hong Kong defense cooperation can
be continued. Currently, about seventy U.S. Navy ships a year
make port visits to Hong Kong for rest and relaxation. Notification for such visits has been routinely handled through the British
government in Hong Kong, and U.S. Administration officials
would like these visits to continue after the transition. Although
Chinese officials have reportedly agreed in principle to continue
such port visits, details have yet to be finalized.
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6.

NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS FOR U.S. POLICY

Unless the U.S. government decides to confront the P.R.C.
more directly concerning the Hong Kong issue, the ability of the
United States to directly affect the course of events in Hong Kong
during the 1997 transition and afterward seems marginal. The
course of U.S.-China relations over 1995-1996 suggests that
Clinton Administration officials might be hesitant to take a more
confrontational approach. After several extraordinarily tense
years in U.S.-China relations, Chinese and U.S. officials now
appear cautiously optimistic about prospects for the near future.
U.S. and Chinese officials quietly have increased the number
of talks and contacts at both the working and senior levels over
the past year. U.S. policymakers seem encouraged by China's
softer rhetoric and Chinese attempts to accommodate some U.S.
concerns about weapons proliferation, human rights, and trade.
Also encouraging are China's efforts to improve its knowledge of
and relations with Congress, including the formation of a highlevel working group on the U.S. Congress headed by a senior
Chinese foreign policy official, Liu Huaqiu, and an increase in the
size of the congressional liaison office at the Chinese Embassy in
Washington.
Chinese officials appear equally encouraged at more muted
rhetoric from the U.S. Congress and at the unprecedented number
of Members of Congress interested in visiting China and talking
with Chinese officials. Beijing may also be pleased at recent
indications that some parts of the U.S. government are discussing
the possibility of extending permanent MFN status to China.
6.1.

The Role of Congress

Against the backdrop of current U.S.-China relations, Clinton
Administration officials likely will spend at least the first half of
1997 concentrating on the pending agreements relating to the U.S.
position in Hong Kong after the transition. U.S. officials appear
confident that no major problems will arise in ongoing discussions, and that the parties will reach an equitable agreement on
most, if not all, outstanding matters. Once an accord is reached,
congressional approval likely will be required on at least some
agreements.
The form of any new U.S.-Hong Kong agreement will
determine the resulting congressional role. Because the United
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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States has a declared policy to treat an autonomous Hong Kong
S.A.R. differently from the way that China is treated in U.S.
policy, the transition poses unusual challenges for Clinton
Administration officials in bringing matters before Congress.
Agreements considered to be treaties will be referred to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and ratified by the Senate only.
Agreements not considered treaties may be reviewed by the whole
Congress, or, conversely, may not need any congressional
consideration. Furthermore, measures formulated as treaties will
be subject to Senate "advice and consent" only; their terms cannot
be altered while the Senate considers ratification. Measures
formulated as legislation, on the other hand, are subject to the
amendment process which allows Congress the opportunity to
make legislative changes.
Given the unique circumstances that will exist for Hong Kong
after the 1997 transition, there appears to be little precedent to
guide how the United States should configure agreements with
Hong Kong. Lacking such guidance, Clinton Administration
officials appear to have greater flexibility to decide whether a
pending agreement with Hong Kong should be considered a treaty
or some other form of agreement.
Regardless of its ultimate role in considering pending agreements with Hong Kong, Congress will maintain an ongoing
interest in the specifics of future U.S.-Hong Kong agreements, as
well as in general U.S.-Hong Kong relations.
The House
International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Affairs
Committee, in particular, are likely to hold hearings early in 1997
on various aspects of the transition process and on the U.S. policy
position with respect to Hong Kong. Given Congress' efforts to
amend the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act in 1995 and 1996,
Congress is likely to revisit the issue in 1997. In particular,
Members of Congress may try again to extend the annual March
reporting requirement mandated by the Hong Kong Policy Act
beyond its current cutoff date in the year 2000.90 Alternatively,
Congress may seek to make permanent the additional reporting
requirements mandated for the 1996 and 1997 reports in the
appropriations bills for those fiscal years. In addition, Members
of Congress may consider adding new reporting requirements to
reflect new issues that might arise in the coming months, such as
90See 22 U.S.C. S 5731 (1994).
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reports on extradition matters and the Hong Kong government's
treatment of U.S. consular officials and U.S. businesses operating
within the territory.
7. LONGER-TERM PROSPECTS FOR U.S. POLICY

The United States has based the separate treatment it is
prepared to give to Hong Kong on the promise of Chinese leaders
that they can pursue a "one country, two systems" policy toward
Hong Kong, and that Hong Kong will have significant autonomy
over its own affairs. This is the reason for the United StatesHong Kong Policy Act - to provide the statutory basis for the
U.S. government to treat one part of a sovereign nation differently from another part. Thus, despite ongoing negotiations with
China, and despite U.S. talks with the Hong Kong government,
the overall direction of U.S. policy ultimately depends on
American satisfaction with the implementation of the "one
country, two systems" concept in Hong Kong.
Despite the apparent improvements in U.S.-China relations, a
number of variables and other key indicators during the coming
months could affect the course of U.S. policy toward Hong Kong.
The U.S. Congress is particularly susceptible to the pressure of a
wide range of interest groups about developments in Hong Kong.
Democracy advocates, journalists, religious groups, businesses, and
others in Hong Kong may seek to pursue their differences with
China by appealing for intervention by Congress and other U.S.
policymakers. Any number of groups - both within China and
Hong Kong and within the United States - will be anxious to
present their own policy alternatives to U.S. policymakers.
Some in Hong Kong and the United States are likely to argue
for a U.S. policy that is more assertive and that focuses on
preserving and expanding political rights in Hong Kong. They
may urge the United States to use liberally the provisions in the
United States-Hong Kong Policy Act that allow the United States
to suspend legal and other benefits for Hong Kong after 1997 if
the P.R.C. does not allow sufficient autonomy there.91 These
benefits range from textile quotas to immigration quotas and
technology transfer restrictions. Their loss to Hong Kong would
have a strong negative impact on China and presumably could be

91 See 22 U.S.C.

§ 5722 (1994).
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used to dissuade P.R.C. authorities from infringing too much on
Hong Kong autonomy. Those supporting a more assertive U.S.
policy argue that the benefits of such an approach, followed
vigorously, outweigh its potential disruptions to U.S.-China
relations.
Others, also generally positive about U.S. involvement in
Hong Kong, argue for a more modulated and calibrated U.S.
policy approach. Many, in Hong Kong in particular, say that
U.S. congressional interest in the territory is beneficial for Hong
Kong because it keeps Hong Kong's profile high. Many of these
observers want the United States and others to show Beijing that
the international community is keenly interested in the outcome
in Hong Kong, and that other countries would take a negative
view of any heavy-handed Chinese pressure in the territory. This
group has pressed for U.S. congressional hearings on Hong Kong
and increased activism by Members of Congress.
Other observers warn against greater U.S. involvement in
Hong Kong. They aver that the P.R.C. is highly sensitive on the
Hong Kong question and that U.S. "meddling" could cause
unpredictable consequences. They have offered little critical
comment on U.S. statements and policy up to this point, but they
indicate that stronger statements of support or an outpouring of
U.S. sympathy for democracy advocates could harden Chinese
policy and seriously erode Hong Kong's autonomy.
Over the longer term, other factors may surface that could

affect congressional attitudes and U.S. policy toward Hong Kong.
A number of key indicators - developments to watch over the
coming months in gauging trends in Hong Kong - can assist

observers in analyzing prospects for the future and making
decisions about the likely course of U.S. policy.
7.1.

The Chief Executive, C.H. Tung

Certainly one crucial factor involves the leadership of Hong
Kong's new Chief Executive, wealthy shipping magnate C.H.
Tung, whose role after July 1, 1997, will be similar to that played
by past British Governors. In accordance with the Basic Law, the
new Chief Executive was chosen by the Beijing-appointed 400member Selection Committee, which announced its selection on
December 11, 1996. Some have expressed concerns about Mr.
Tung's fitness for the job - wondering, for instance, whether the
lucrative Chinese government shipping contracts that saved his
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss1/14
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company from bankruptcy years ago may make him too beholden
to Beijing. But Tung has moved carefully and swiftly in his early
tenure in office. His decision to retain in office senior-level civil

servants - particularly Anson Chan, the highly-respected Chief
Secretary and second-highest ranking official in Hong Kong bolstered optimism that no drastic governmental changes would
occur after July 1, 1997.
72.

The Civil Service

Continuity in Hong Kong's civil service and China's approach
to civil service issues are commonly viewed in Hong Kong to be
crucial elements in Hong Kong's future. Although the Joint
Declaration guarantees that Hong Kong's civil servants will be
able to continue at their jobs with full pay and benefits - and
Tung's decision to retain senior officials appears to reinforce this
guarantee - concern remains about the attrition rate in the civil
service. Concern is particularly high about civil service professionals, some of which continue to leave their jobs prematurely by
either moving to the private sector or taking early retirement.
Currently, the vacancy rate within the civil service is reported
to be below four percent, and any gaps have been filled by hiring
consultants or contractors. However, of the estimated 1,400 civil
servants who are considered "key" in running Hong Kong
efficiently, approximately twenty percent are eligible for early
retirement prior to China's takeover. If those eligible decide to
elect for early retirement, government services could suffer,
resulting in a sharp erosion of public confidence that, in turn,
could have collateral effects. Of particular concern is the
retention rate within Hong Kong's police force and judiciary institutions essential for maintaining stability and international
confidence in Hong Kong.
7.3. ProvisionalLegislature
Beijing's decision to dissolve the elected Legislative Council on
July 1, 1997, and to replace it with an appointed temporary body,
the so-called "provisional legislature," is likely to be an acid test
for U.S. confidence regarding the "one country, two systems"
concept. A provisional legislative body is not provided for in
either the Joint Declaration or the Basic Law, and Beijing's
decision to appoint such a group is viewed by many U.S.
policymakers as the beginning of heavy-handed Chinese interferPublished by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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ence in Hong Kong's promised decision-making autonomy. The
behavior of the provisional legislature, legislative actions taken by
the provisional legislature during its tenure, the length of time
before elections are held for the first Hong Kong S.A.R. Legislative Council (and whether Beijing honors its commitments about
the first legislature)," and the reaction of democracy advocates
in Hong Kong to the provisional body constitute factors that are
likely to have continuing repercussions for U.S. policy.
7.4. Freedom of the Press
The extent to which China allows freedom of expression including freedom of the press and freedom of assembly - is
another key variable that can indicate likely U.S. policy towards
Hong Kong. Under the Basic Law, China has accepted a number
of provisions with regard to Hong Kong's political and economic
future. Among these legal guarantees is one contained in Article
27 of the Basic Law, which declares:
Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the
press and of publication; freedom of association, of
assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and the
right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to
strike.93

On April 4, 1990, China's Seventh National People's Congress adopted
a document entitled the Decision of the National People's Congress on the
Method for the Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region. Paragraph 6 of this
document states:
The first Legislative Council of the Hong Kong S.A.R. shall be
composed of 60 members, with 20 members returned by geographical
constituencies through direct elections, 10 members returned by an
election committee, and 30 members returned by functional constituencies. If the composition of the last Hong Kong Legislative Council
before the establishment of the Hong Kong S.A.R. is in conformity
with the relevant provisions of this Decision and the Basic Law of the
Hong Kong S.A.R., those of its members who uphold the Basic Law
of the Hong Kong S.A.R. of the People's Republic of China and
pledge allegiance to the Hong Kong S.A.R. of the P.R.C., and who
meet the requirements set forth in the Basic Law of the Region may,
upon confirmation by the Preparatory Committee, become members
of the first Legislative Council of the Region.
" Basic Law, supra note 10, art. 27.
92

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss1/14

U.S. ROLE

19971

Despite the apparent clarity of such language, Chinese officials
routinely make statements suggesting that either a more restrictive
approach to or total disregard of these provisions will prevail after
the transition to Chinese rule. China's Foreign Minister, Qian
Qichen, who is also chairman of the Preparatory Committee, has
been quoted as saying that journalists would be able to publish
criticism, "but not rumors or lies" or personal attacks on Chinese
leaders. 4 Apart from the dissolution of Legco, Beijing's approach to issues of personal freedom in Hong Kong could be the
most volatile issues surrounding the transition.
8.

CONCLUSIONS

A widespread view in the international community is that
better relations between the United States and China - the two
largest economic players in Hong Kong - will be a key component in Hong Kong's future. Some fear that Hong Kong could
easily become a collateral casualty of poor U.S.-China relations.
Therefore, many observers with policy suggestions to offer the
United States include among them that the United States should
hold regular high-level dialogues with Chinese officials, have more
economic exchanges with China, and seek to minimize actions
that seem to challenge China's sovereignty or authority over
Hong Kong. By the same token, better U.S.-China relations could
facilitate a more visible U.S. presence in Hong Kong, even in the
face of objections from Beijing. Such an enhanced presence could
include expanded direct U.S. contacts with Hong Kong and a
continued U.S. insistence that China honor the terms of the SinoBritish Joint Declaration.
Ultimately, over the next few years, the Clinton Administration and Members of Congress are likely to be in the difficult
position of having to balance a number of often competing U.S.
policy goals. They will have to make difficult choices between
U.S. economic, political, and security goals in China on the one
hand, and U.S. economic and political imperatives in Hong Kong
on the other. Additionally, bearing in mind the United StatesHong Kong Policy Act, they will certainly be monitoring China's

94 Erik Guyot, Free-PressFearsSpread to FinancialNews, ASIAN WALL ST.
J., Oct. 18, 1996, at 3, available in 1996 WL-WSJA 12476138.
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adherence to its commitments concerning Hong Kong's future.
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